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THE EUROPEAN UNION has many admirers around the world, 
including here in the United 
States, in the neoliberal heart-
land. Many of us view the idea, 
if i t is not always the reality, of 
Social Europe as a benchmark 
for human-centered economic 
integration in a global economy. 
We look to our ‘old European’ 
friends for inspiration, as we 
endure the collapse of our own 
lame-duck regime and look to a 
better future. 
Yet we know all is not well in 
Social Europe. Social democrats 
and trade unionists struggle to 
impose a social model on what 
is essentially a project of market 
integration. Social standards are 
inadequate at the European 
level, even as they are weakened 
at the national level. The pages 
of this and other journals are 
filled with criticism of the 
underdeveloped levels of democ-
racy, inclusion, legitimacy, and 
labour and social standards as 
the European project proceeds – 
or more recently, stalls. Experts, 
officials and activists call for 
reforms in all these areas, to 
embed social rights and stan-
dards more deeply in processes 
of economic integration. 
It is not my intent to enter 
these discussions by way of pol-
icy recommendations or sugges-
tions for reform. The last thing 
Europeans need at this point in 
history is more Americans 
telling them how to do things. 
What I do want to suggest, how-
ever, is that progressive reforms, 
whether in Europe, the U.S., or 
anywhere else, are dependent to 
a significant extent on the 
strength of trade unions and 
their capacity to promote stan-
dards and reform policy, at 
local, national, regional and 
international levels, based not 
only on a defense of existing 
standards but also on a vision of 
expanded democratic participa-
tion in political, economic and 
social decision-making process-
es of all kinds. The weakened 
influence of unions in so many 
countries around the world, 
including Europe, is a major 
factor that has permitted the 
spread of what Joseph Stiglitz 
and others have called ‘market 
fundamentalism’, and at the 
same time limited the potential 
expansion of social standards. 
‘Progressive reforms are dependent 
to a significant extent on the 
strength of trade unions and their 
capacity to promote standards and 
reform policy, at local, national, 
regional and international levels’ 
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In the crisis of declining 
union influence, the United 
States has played a vanguard 
role. The weakness of labour in 
the U.S. has opened the door to 
the neoliberal policies devel-
oped here and then imposed on 
the global economy. More 
recent efforts to revitalise the 
labour movement aim, among 
other things, to reverse such 
policies. In suffering union 
decline and grappling for new 
strategies, we have what 
Alexander Gerschenkron once 
called the ‘advantages of back-
wardness’. Ironically, European 
unions and social democrats 
can perhaps derive lessons not 
only from our failures but also 
from our efforts to turn the tide. 
Institutional change 
While employer opposition and 
government policy drove union 
decline in the U.S., unions must 
also bear responsibility for their 
inadequate strategic response. 
The institutional literature, 
including its latest ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ incarnation, obscures 
the fact that New Deal institu-
tions once incorporated 
American unions in a recognized 
position within the political 
economy. Labour movement 
upsurge in the 1930s drove insti-
tution building and processes of 
inclusion – never as strong as 
postwar social partnership rela-
tionships in northern Europe but 
quite substantial nonetheless. 
What can be won, however, can 
also be lost. This is the challenge 
now facing many European 
unions, as membership declines 
along with economic and politi-
cal influence, even in countries 
where unions remain anchored 
in strong labour institutions. 
Thus a varieties-of-capitalism 
breakaway literature on institu-
tional change, associated, for 
example, with the work of 
Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen 
Thelen, identifies the incremen-
tal hollowing out of once strong 
institutions of social policy and 
economic regulation. Over time, 
incremental changes at the 
national level lead to transfor-
mation, in ways hardly 
favourable to the building of a 
social Europe. 
In a market economy, labour 
and social institutions I would 
argue need periodic revitaliza-
tion through pressure from the 
grassroots. The social move-
ments of the 1960s, for exam-
ple, applied pressure that 
strengthened national labour 
institutions, most dramatically 
in Italy but in Germany and 
other countries as well, and 
opened the door for a period of 
social activism in the 1970s at 
the European level. 
One problem for contempo-
rary social institutions and poli-
cies of the E.U. is that they have 
been built up over the past 15 
years without the pressure of 
grassroots mobilization. For 
labour such institutions 
include, for example, the wel-
come expansion of the 
European Trade Union 
Confederation and the spread of 
European works councils – but 
largely from the top down. In a 
1996 article in the European 
Journal of Industrial Relations, I 
called this ‘structure without 
action’. The argument, and the 
hope, was that European-level 
labour structures would open 
the door for the grassroots 
engagement necessary to 
breathe life into the new institu-
tions. Examples today include 
recent Europe-wide actions 
organised through the European 
Works Council at General 
Motors. For the most part, how-
ever, European-level labour 
institutions have remained 
structures without enough 
grassroots action. 
Proponents of social Europe 
have argued, in the pages of this 
journal and elsewhere, for 
expanded social rights, codeter-
mination, a better balance 
between democracy and eco-
nomic progress, a clearer vision 
for the European society of the 
future and its role in the global 
arena. These are grand ambi-
tions for which success wi l l 
surely require sustained strug-
gle. Against great opposition in 
a context of global liberaliza-
tion, real breakthroughs are 
unlikely without the active par-
ticipation of large numbers of 
European workers and residents 
in campaigns for reform. And it 
is hard to imagine the mobiliza-
tion of such participation in the 
absence of leadership from revi-
talized trade unions. 
National strategies and grass-
roots mobilization 
This is where the U.S. labour 
movement has lessons to offer. 
The dubious distinction of 
early, sustained decline has 
driven unions to experiment 
with innovation. In the 1980s 
and 1990s, efforts to build firm-
level ‘labour-management coop-
eration’ largely failed, both to 
reform the workplace and to 
renew union strength. 
Concessions and cooperation 
from a position of weakness did 
little to revive a continually 
declining labour movement. 
More promising since the early 
1990s have been comprehensive 
campaigns based on strategic 
union leadership, grassroots 
mobilisation and coalitions with 
other social actors. 
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‘New strategies to rebuild union 
membership are necessary, both 
where unions have been strong and 
especially where unions are weak’ 
Organising the unorganised is 
a central goal of many such 
campaigns. Given intense 
employer opposition to unions 
in the U.S., organising here is 
quite different from ‘in-fill’ in 
the U.K. or the recruitment of 
union members by works coun-
cilors in Germany. The latter 
two cases assume that unions 
already have a meaningful pres-
ence in the workplace, a reality 
that is less and less true as 
employment expands in weak-
union sectors. In retail, hospital-
ity, building services and infor-
mation technology industries, 
for example, union presence is 
generally much weaker than in 
manufacturing. Private sector 
sales clerks, hotel housekeepers, 
security guards, cleaners and 
computer repair technicians are 
far less likely to belong to 
unions than are skilled factory 
workers, truck drivers, construc-
tion workers or public sector 
employees. At the same time, 
membership density even for 
the traditionally unionised is 
also dropping, in Europe as well 
as in the United States. 
New strategies to rebuild 
union membership are neces-
sary, both where unions have 
been strong and especially where 
unions are weak. Two examples 
from service sector organising in 
the U.S. illustrate possibilities 
based on innovative tactics and 
strategic, comprehensive cam-
paigns. One is ‘Justice for 
Janitors’, a strategy developed at 
the national union headquarters 
of the SEIU (Service Employees 
International Union) when John 
Sweeney was president of that 
union in the 1980s. The cam-
paign aimed to organise thou-
sands of janitors, most of them 
working in large office buildings, 
on a city-by-city basis. Building 
owners typically sub-contracted 
this work and claimed no 
responsibility for what in most 
cases were the extremely low 
wages and poor working condi-
tions of the armies of workers 
who cleaned their buildings. 
The key to the campaign was 
to frame the issue not simply as 
union organising but as a matter 
of social justice. The lavish 
wealth obvious in shiny corpo-
rate headquarters contrasted 
sharply with the poverty of the 
building services workforce. 
With tactics borrowed from the 
civil rights movement, the union 
used the campaign to shine a 
bright light on the growing eco-
nomic and social polarisation in 
American society. Details are 
many and much has been writ-
ten on this case for those want-
ing more specifics, but the key 
elements include the following. 
The national union brought 
the campaign to local unions in 
cities where conditions seemed 
right. The national office offered 
strategic guidance and a serious 
commitment of resources – 
money, staff, advice and other 
support. The local union used 
trained organisers to take the 
issues to the workers, who often 
responded with great enthusi-
asm. Demonstrations, rallies, 
support from churches, commu-
nity and civil rights organisa-
tions: such tactics brought the 
campaign into the open to win 
over local politicians and garner 
public support. Demands target-
ed building owners and large 
corporate tenants, insisting they 
take responsibility even though 
the workers who cleaned their 
offices were not technically 
their employees. Pressure came 
from many directions, including 
the ‘shaming’ of wealthy compa-
nies and their CEOs. 
In Denver in 1986, Los 
Angeles in 1990, and in many 
other cities including a recent 
breakthrough victory in largely 
non-union Houston, owners and 
contractors were brought to the 
table and forced to sign manage-
ment neutrality agreements. 
With employer opposition 
pushed aside, the union signed 
up thousands of janitors in each 
city case. The campaigns also 
resulted in spillover: in Los 
Angeles, for example, the 
Justice for Janitors victory 
became a launching pad for the 
revitalisation of the labour 
movement, now a powerful 
force in a city where unions had 
been significantly marginalized 
since the 1980s. 
In Houston, Denver and Los 
Angeles, janitors are largely 
Latino, many of them recent 
immigrants from Mexico, and 
this is also true in other cities. 
Union organising efforts blend-
ed with immigrant rights cam-
paigns, offering a mechanism 
for the mobilisation of excluded 
low-wage workers and their 
integration into American socie-
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ty. In a society of great inequali-
ty, not only between rich and 
poor but increasingly between 
the rich and everyone else, 
Justice for Janitors offers a cam-
paign model in which the inter-
ests of low-wage workers coin-
cide with broader struggles for a 
socially sustainable society, a 
‘social America’ if we dare use 
that term. 
A more recent example is the 
Hotel Workers Rising campaign 
of 2006. In the U.S., hotels are 
typically organised and collec-
tive bargaining takes place on a 
city-by-city basis, at individual 
hotels or in some cases with a 
local association of hotel 
employers (which includes 
some but not all hotels in a 
given city). Thus some Hyatt 
hotels are unionised and some 
non-union, and each hotel in 
each city confronts organising 
campaigns separately and at dif-
ferent times. Extreme decentral-
isation makes it extremely diffi-
cult for the union to organise 
workers or bargain contracts. 
Over a period of several 
years, the union representing 
hotel workers, UNITE HERE, 
negotiated contracts set to 
expire in the same year, 2006, 
in a number of major cities in 
the U.S. and Canada, including 
New York City, Boston, Chicago, 
Los Angeles, Honolulu and 
Toronto. San Francisco was 
already in the midst of a pro-
tracted struggle and was thus 
also included in the campaign. 
The union crafted a national 
strategy, to be implemented 
city-by-city, with the implicit 
threat of a national strike or 
rolling strikes at particular firms 
or cities, supported by solidarity 
actions in other areas. In each 
city, the union developed 
alliances of support with social 
actors, especially churches, 
immigrant rights groups, local 
politicians and elected officials, 
and with an extensive network 
of groups such as the Sierra 
Club, ACORN (Association of 
Community Organizations for 
Reform Now) and Jobs with 
Justice, itself a broad coalition 
of local unions and social jus-
tice organisations. 
Because many hotel workers 
are housekeepers, most of them 
women working for low wages 
with few rights, many of them 
immigrants or African-
Americans, the union was in 
this case also able to frame the 
issue in terms of social justice. 
Through press conferences, 
spirited rallies that drew large 
numbers of participants and 
attracted media coverage, 
through publicity within sup-
porting religious, community 
and political organisations and 
by other means, the union was 
able to broadcast its message. 
The great advantages of union 
representation were highlighted: 
for non-union hotels, wages typ-
ically not far above the legal 
minimum with no health care 
or pension benefits; at union 
hotels, even belonging to the 
same company and sometimes 
in the same city, twice the 
wages with ful l health and pen-
sion coverage and in some cases 
training rights as well. 
Because most large urban 
hotels are owned by one of the 
major chains, and because prof-
its are accumulated at national 
and even global scales, compa-
nies had long been able to take 
strike losses at single hotels or 
cities without undue loss. The 
union, therefore, targeted the 
major companies – Hilton, 
Starwood, Hyatt, Marriott – 
with simultaneous campaigns 
across a range of large cities. 
Demands included not only pay 
and benefit raises at unionised 
hotels but, most importantly, 
neutrality agreements which 
allow the union to sign up 
workers at non-union hotels 
without major employer opposi-
tion. 
By the end of 2006, the cam-
paign had achieved significant 
success. Beginning in New York 
City, where hotels are most 
heavily unionised, and moving 
across the country, UNITE 
HERE won impressive settle-
ments for its members, gained 
public and political support, 
and signed up thousands of new 
members. In many cases, the 
union also won management 
neutrality agreements, opening 
the door for many more new 
members in 2007 and beyond. 
Keys to victory included an 
innovative national strategy 
based on simultaneous cam-
paigns across the country, led in 
each city by well trained staff 
committed on a full-time basis 
to the campaign; the active sup-
port of religious, community 
and other social actors as well 
as political organisations and 
officials; public support based 
on compelling demands for 
social justice; and grassroots 
mobilisation, the active partici-
pation of both union members 
and workers at non-union 
hotels, at demonstrations, infor-
mational picket lines and in 
ongoing organising efforts. 
A final example concerns pol-
itics and election campaigns. 
Although labour’s numbers are 
low, unions have over the past 
decade increasingly mobilised 
members and their families to 
get out the vote. Together with 
environmental, anti-war, com-
munity and local political organ-
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isations, African-American and 
immigrant rights groups, inter-
net activist organisations and 
other allies, unions contributed 
significantly to the election of a 
Democratic Congress in 2006. 
And in a break with earlier prac-
tice, labour did so conditionally, 
case-by-case, based on explicit 
candidate support for labour’s 
agenda, from minimum wage to 
expanded health care coverage 
to fair trade (meaning trade 
agreements that include basic 
labour and social standards). 
Most importantly for the future 
of unions and a litmus test for 
labour support, unions demand-
ed candidate commitment to the 
Employee Free Choice Act 
(EFCA) legislation, designed to 
remove major employer-led bar-
riers in the way of union organi-
sation and growth. In the new 
Congress, the House of 
Representatives passed this criti-
cal piece of legislation soon after 
taking office in early 2007. 
Although our current president 
would never sign such a bi l l , the 
groundwork is laid for a better 
outcome after the 2008 elections 
– for which unions wi l l mobilise 
like never before. Again keys to 
success are national strategy and 
resources, local mobilisation, 
and broad alliances with other 
organisations. 
A final note: many European 
unionists and social democrats 
are puzzled by the 2005 labour 
movement split, resulting in 
two major federations, the AFL-
CIO and Change to Win (CTW). 
That story is too long to tell 
here. But the reality is that 
although SEIU and UNITE 
HERE (the unions that led 
Justice for Janitors and Hotel 
Workers Rising) are CTW 
unions and that federation has 
made the strongest commitment 
to organizing, a parallel expan-
sion of innovative organising is 
also on the agenda at the AFL-
CIO, including unions such as 
the Communication Workers of 
America (CWA) and the United 
Steelworkers (USW). And the 
two federations have worked 
together on the political front, 
each of them devoting massive 
resources to voter education 
and get-out-the-vote drives in 
the 2006 elections, with more to 
come in 2008. Both federations 
are actively campaigning for 
EFCA, with its promise to kick 
open the door for renewed 
union growth. 
Transatlantic Social Dialogue 
My argument is not that these 
organising and campaigning 
strategies are directly transfer-
able to Europe – any more than 
we can adopt works councils 
legislation to strengthen 
labour’s hand any time in the 
foreseeable future. Rather I 
believe that new strategies, 
based on innovative activism on 
the part of unions and workers, 
perhaps drawing a few lessons 
and some inspiration from cur-
rent union efforts in the U.S., 
could strengthen unions and 
thereby help to revitalise the 
social Europe project. 
The British Trades Union 
Congress, for example, used les-
sons from U.S. organising 
efforts to build an Organising 
Academy in the 1990s. Over the 
past two years, the Transport 
and General Workers Union has 
for the first time hired large 
numbers full-time organizers. 
The T&G has also worked with 
SEIU in common efforts, to 
organise cleaners at Canary 
Wharf and in other campaigns. 
In Apri l of 2005, I attended a 
remarkable week-long confer-
ence called Never Work Alone, 
hosted in Hamburg by ver.di 
(the consolidated service work-
ers union in Germany) and co-
sponsored by the Hans-Böckler-
Stiftung and the School of 
Industrial and Labor Relations 
at Cornell University, organised 
together by ver.di and OrKa, a 
small consulting firm dedicated 
to the spread of organising and 
campaigning strategies among 
German unions. Activist-mind-
ed ver.di officials drew on an 
earlier successful campaign at 
the Schlecker drug store chain, 
a 1994-95 comprehensive effort 
– led by HBV (the banking, 
insurance and retail union that 
merged into ver.di in 2001) in 
Mannheim – that looked very 
much like Justice for Janitors 
and Hotel Workers Rising in the 
emphasis on innovative strate-
gy, grassroots engagement and 
coalition building. Conference 
planners invited organisers from 
SEIU, UNITE HERE and CWA to 
‘New strategies, perhaps drawing a 
few lessons and some inspiration 
from current union efforts in the 
U.S., could strengthen unions and 
thereby help to revitalise the social 
Europe project’ 
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share experiences and offer les-
sons from their own successes 
in the U.S. It was clear that 
ver.di officials in attendance, 
including the national vice pres-
ident, were impressed. Ver.di 
subsequently hired its first ful l-
time organisers, to target build-
ing security guards in Hamburg, 
and invited an SEIU organiser 
to spend a year working with 
them on the campaign. 
Such experiences have also 
laid the groundwork for nascent 
transnational campaigns to 
organise workers in building 
services (cleaners, security 
guards and maintenance work-
ers), food service (for cafeterias, 
workplaces, schools, stores), 
hotels and retail stores, aimed at 
multinational corporations doing 
business on both continents. 
Although breakthroughs take 
time, organising and campaign-
ing strategies offer possibilities 
for strengthening labour move-
ments on both sides of the pond. 
Labour and the revitalisation of 
social Europe 
None of this is meant to imply 
that unions in the U.S. do not 
have more to learn from 
European unions than you do 
from us, from social policy to 
labour institutions and labour 
market regulation. In most coun-
tries, European unions have 
much stronger institutional 
anchors on which to build 
renewed union growth, if and 
when this becomes an organisa-
tional priority. In Nordrhein-
Westfalen, for example, IG 
Metall has developed an innova-
tive strategy based on proactive 
plant-level negotiation, ‘besser 
statt billinger’ initiatives, and 
member recruitment. The region-
al union in NRW considers the 
latter to be most crucial, the key 
benchmark by which other 
strategies are evaluated. The 
heightened priority on member-
ship growth is new for IG Metall, 
as it would be for many 
European unions. Aided by 
export strength and renewed 
economic growth, there are sig-
nificant signs of success. The 
active training of works coun-
cilors and union members to 
recruit new members parallels 
the American emphasis on 
organising the unorganised, in a 
far more favourable context that 
includes institutional support 
and a tradition of union strength. 
This is the kind of strategy that 
many more European unions 
could be taking. 
An important point to repeat 
here is the emphasis, in the 
United States, on organising 
low-wage workers. This makes 
great sense in the U.S. given the 
vast ‘low road’ portion of our 
economic structure (from 
unprotected day labourers to 
Wal-Mart ‘associates’). Here 
again we have the advantages of 
backwardness, for what is now 
also a growing concern in 
Europe as inequality there 
increases. Union organising can 
raise the low-road threshold, 
improve living standards for 
millions of underpaid workers, 
and promote broader social 
integration. Especially impor-
tant in the U.S. case is that so 
many of these low-wage work-
ers are women, immigrants and 
from racial or ethnic minorities. 
In the previous issue of Social 
Europe, Jürgen Habermas called 
for policies of inclusion for the 
growing numbers of immigrant 
and migrant workers and fami-
lies in countries throughout the 
European Union and incidental-
ly mentioned that Europeans 
can learn something from the 
U.S. in this area. Union organis-
ing drives that target such work-
ers are a potentially powerful 
mechanism for social inclusion. 
Contrary to popular belief, 
organisers in the U.S. have 
found that immigrants and 
women are in fact more recep-
tive to joining unions than 
native-born white male workers, 
when unions reach out to them. 
This is also consistent with 
what we know about native-
born African American workers, 
who have long been the most 
receptive population group in 
the U.S. when it comes to union 
organisation. 
While low-wage workers are 
most in need of union represen-
tation and the civic integration 
that unions can offer, union 
organising and collective bar-
gaining are also much needed in 
mid-range jobs, in health care, 
education, transportation, con-
struction, telecommunications, 
light manufacturing and more. 
Strategies must be appropriate 
for particular industries and 
occupations, but comprehensive 
campaigns of one kind or anoth-
er have clearly demonstrated 
potential at many levels in the 
U.S. Thus efforts to organise 
nurses, bus drivers and flight 
attendants often look quite like 
the campaigns aimed at janitors 
and hotel housekeepers. It must 
be said that neither these nor 
any other strategic approaches 
have yet reversed the decline of 
the American labour movement. 
Innovative organising and cam-
paigning efforts, however, have 
breathed new life into the 
movement and offered the best 
chances for a revival of mem-
bership and influence. 
The main point of this article 
is not to suggest that European 
unions adopt organising and 
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campaigning strategies devel-
oped by unions in the U.S., 
except where such approaches 
make sense to leaders and 
activists. Rather, the central 
argument is that active grass-
roots participation, in political, 
economic and social reform 
projects, is an essential compo-
nent for the revitalization of 
social Europe, and in such 
efforts innovative unions have 
an important role to play. 
Transparency, electoral and 
institutional reforms, a constitu-
tion with clearly defined social 
rights, stronger directives and 
regulations for social and labour 
issues – all of these are impor-
tant. Coming largely from the 
top down, however, such 
reforms are unlikely in them-
selves to relaunch a project of 
European integration that 
addresses not only the expan-
sion of internal markets and 
external influence but popular 
legitimacy and support as well. 
In the development of new 
approaches that combine strate-
gic leadership, grassroots 
engagement and broad social 
alliances, European unions and 
other social actors just may find 
useful lessons from the crisis-
driven innovations of their 
counterparts across the sea. 
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